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Abstract: The resilience of health systems has received considerable attention as of late, yet little
is known about what a resilience test might look like. We develop a resilience test concept and
methodology. We describe key components of a toolkit and a 5-phased approach to implementation
of resilience testing that can be adapted to individual health systems. We develop a methodology
for a test that is balanced in terms of standardization and system-specific characteristics/needs. We
specify how to work with diverse stakeholders from the health ecosystem via participatory processes
to assess and identify recommendations for health system strengthening. The proposed resilience
test toolkit consists of “what if” adverse scenarios, a menu of health system performance elements
and indicators based on an input-output-outcomes framework, a discussion guide for each adverse
scenario, and a traffic light scorecard template. The five phases of implementation include Phase
0, a preparatory phase to adapt the toolkit materials; Phase 1: facilitated discussion groups with
stakeholders regarding the adverse scenarios; Phase 2: supplemental data collection of relevant
quantitative indicators; Phase 3: summarization of results; Phase 4: action planning and health
system transformation. The toolkit and 5-phased approach can support countries to test resilience of
health systems, and provides a concrete roadmap to its implementation.
Keywords: COVID-19; health system; resilience testing
1. Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has put national health systems under immense pressure.
Health systems throughout the world demonstrated different levels of preparedness for an
outbreak of this magnitude. The crisis tested the ability and capacity of health systems to
absorb, effectively respond and adapt to shocks and structural changes while sustaining
day-to-day operations; in other words, it tested ‘health systems’ resilience’. There are vari-
ous definitions of resilience. A frequently cited definition, offered by Kruk and colleagues
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(2015), defines health system resilience as “the capacity of health actors, institutions, and
populations to prepare for and effectively respond to crises; maintain core functions when
a crisis hits; and, informed by lessons learnt during the crisis, reorganize if conditions
require it” [1].
Health system resilience has been on policy agendas for many years [2]. Most re-
cently, prior to COVID-19, the 2019 State of Health in the EU country reports highlighted
longstanding concerns about resilience. Yet, it was only after the COVID-19 outbreak that
country-specific recommendations on health systems resilience have been made to each
Member State in the European Semester process [3]. Numerous analyses have already
been published on the impact of immediate crisis response measures (e.g., [4–6]). Notwith-
standing this extensive literature, there is a need to look beyond the current pandemic and
identify new frameworks and policy tools that affect health care organization in order to
better prepare for future crises and other challenges that may affect health care delivery.
Testing the resilience of health systems has also received considerable attention as
of late as a potential approach to strengthen health care systems [7]. However, there is
limited literature to guide research development of the application of a resilience test or
what it might look like in practice. Yet, since the 1990s, resilience testing has been used
in the banking sector, in the form of internal stress tests. The health care sector can build
on such experiences. In a ‘resilience test’ of health systems, shocks or structural changes
could be introduced in ‘what if’ scenarios [8]. Hypothetical responses to the shock could
be examined to identify strengths and weaknesses in system performance under potential
stress. Following lessons learned from the example of bank stress tests, such resilience tests
should value contextualized exercises over standardized ones, learn from the process of
producing the results rather than the results themselves, and develop solutions to address
failure [8]. The International Health Regulations of the World Health Organization offers a
Joint External Evaluation Tool (JEE Tool, see: https://www.who.int/ihr/procedures/joint-
external-evaluations/en/) to assess country preparedness and response capacities to public
health risks. Limitations of the self-evaluation phase is that it occurs at the level of the
ministries, which means the results provided for the external evaluation phase tend to be
restricted to official sources of information. Both the concept and methodology for health
system resilience testing need to be further explored in order to be useful for practical
implementation leading to meaningful results.
In 2020, the European Commission requested its Expert Panel on Effective Ways of
Investing in Health (Expert Panel), comprising 17 experts from across the EU, to opera-
tionalize the concept of resilience testing of a health system [9]. Building on that work [10],
this paper further develops the resilience test concept and methodology, enhancing the
description of key components of a toolkit that could be adapted to individual health
systems and a 5-phased approach to implementation of resilience testing. First, we provide
a definition of resilience and propose an appropriate framework for the examination of
resilience in health systems. Second, we illustrate the use of the framework in the context of
a resilience test. Third, we detail the main components of the resilience test toolkit, which
can be adapted to different health systems. Lastly, we propose a roadmap for resilience
test implementation. The discussion section reflects upon these advancements and offers
directions for future research.
We contribute to the previous literature by refining the definition of resilience, which
maps into a multidimensional framework for health and social care, and developing a
pragmatic set of tools and guidelines for resilience test structure and implementation. We
go beyond existing literature by specifying methods to work with diverse stakeholders from
the health ecosystem via participatory processes to assess and identify recommendations
for health system strengthening.
2. Materials and Methods
The present paper builds and extends work conducted by the Expert Panel [9]. A liter-
ature review on the concept of resilience in health systems and experiences with resilience
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 4742 3 of 17
testing in other sectors was conducted (e.g., banking). A subgroup of the Expert Panel
(authors) explored concept definitions, frameworks, methodologies, early experiences and
lessons learnt on health system resilience during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic,
drawing on the scientific and grey literature including reports from international organiza-
tions (e.g., OECD, WHO), networks and working groups (e.g., EU Expert Group on Health
Systems Performance Assessment). H.L.R., P.P.B., J.D.M., L.L., D.S., and J.Z. held four
monthly meetings between June and September 2020 to discuss and critically appraise the
literature and draft and review text. H.R. drafted text based on discussion for review and
consensus. This work was shared with the larger drafting group (see Acknowledgements
section) and the responsible technical officers of the European Commission’s Directorate
General on Health and Food Safety (DG SANTE). Draft versions of the opinion were shared
with the broader Expert Panel in plenary meetings to incorporate their professional experi-
ences in health system policy, practice and research. The resulting opinion was discussed
in a public hearing and improved accordingly.
3. Results
3.1. Definition of Resilience and an Underlying Framework for Its Assessment in Health Systems
3.1.1. Definition
A practical definition of resilience is the first requirement at the core of the resilience
test. Resilience of health system addresses three main capacities: absorptive, adaptive,
and transformative [11]. The absorptive capacity relates to the capacity of a health system
to continue to deliver the same level (access, quality and equity) of health care services
and protection to populations despite the shock using the same level of resources and
capacities. Adaptive capacity is the capacity of the health system actors to deliver the same
level of health care services with fewer and/or different resources, which requires making
organizational adaptations. The transformative capacity describes the ability of health
system actors to transform the functions and structure of the health system to respond to a
changing environment.
Using these elements, the Expert Group on Health Systems Performance Assessment
provide a useful working definition of resilience, emphasizing the importance of the
transformational capacity of the health system [12]: “Health system resilience describes the
capacity of a health system to
(a) proactively foresee;
(b) absorb; and
(c) adapt to shocks and structural changes in a way that allows it to
(i) sustain required operations;
(ii) resume optimal performance as quickly as possible;
(iii) transform its structure and functions to strengthen the system; and (possibly)
(iv) reduce its vulnerability to similar shocks and structural changes in the future”.
The implication of this definition for resilience testing is the need for system transfor-
mation to ensure optimal health system functioning in the long term.
3.1.2. Framework
A common conceptual framework of resilient health systems is required to develop
a resilience test. In the Opinion [10], The Expert Panel developed the Multi-dimensional
Health and Social Care Systems (MHSCS) conceptual framework that builds on previous
ones [13–15]. In 2009, the World Bank, the Global Alliance on Vaccines Initiative (GAVI)
and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) offered a moni-
toring and evaluation framework to assess strengthening of health systems and a focus
on data collection. This framework uses the inputs-outputs-outcomes approach [13]. In
2010, the World Health Organization (WHO) identified six ‘building blocks’ of a health
system: health service delivery, health workforce, health information systems, access to
essential medicines, health systems financing, and leadership and governance [14]. Lastly,
in 2018, Sacks and colleagues extended the WHO 2010 ‘building blocks’ model to include
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community services [15], as community organizations and societal partnerships make
important contributions to health outcomes. The MHSCS conceptual framework presented
in Figure 1 combines and extends the elements from these three frameworks. It uses an
inputs-outputs-outcomes structure to illustrate the relationships among key elements that
contribute to viable and resilient health systems that support the Sustainable Development
Goals [10]. See Figure 1.
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, x  4 of 17 
 
 
on data collection. This framework uses the inputs-outputs-outcomes approach [13]. In 
2010, the World Health Organization (WHO) identified six ‘building blocks’ of a health 
system: health service delivery, health workforce, health information systems, access to 
essential medicines, health systems financing, and leadership and governance [14]. 
Lastly, in 2018, Sacks and colleagues extended the WHO 2010 ‘building blocks’ model to 
include community services [15], as community organizations and societal partnerships 
make important contributions to health outcomes. The MHSCS conceptual framework 
presented in Figure 1 combines and extends the elements from these three frameworks. It 
uses an inputs-outputs-outcomes structure to illustrate the relationships among key el-
ements that contribute to viable and resilient health systems that support the Sustainable 
Development Goals [10]. See Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Multi-dimensional Health and Social Care Systems (MHSCS) conceptual framework. 
Source: Expert Panel Opinion [10]. 
Elements of the MHSCS conceptual framework feature within and across the in-
puts-outputs-outcomes structure. Health workers and community carers are health sys-
tem critical “inputs” that must be supported by adequate infrastructure (buildings, pri-
mary and secondary care facilities, equipment) and information systems. Governance 
and leadership help to ensure that everyone works towards a common goal, including 
cooperation across health systems. Among the “outputs” of the health system, health and 
community workers deliver health services, social and community care, and health 
promotion activities. Furthermore, health services must be accessible, of high quality, 
and responsive to patient needs. In terms of “outcomes”, health services contribute to the 
health and well-being of patients and individuals, and the rules governing the access to 
such services (e.g., the absence of co-payments) determine financial protection. Equity is 
a ubiquitous health system objective, but inequities frequently persist both in the health 
care delivery (“output”) and in health or other “outcomes”. Efficiency, through improved 
organization and delivery of health and community services (“outputs”), can also im-
prove “outcomes” through better access, quality and responsiveness (“outputs”). Fi-
nancing arrangements affect both users and providers of health care. Existing and po-
tential future patients contribute to financial protection by financing the health system 
through taxes and social insurance contributions. In turn, the resources collected are re-
distributed to providers under a wide range of financial arrangements. 
3.2. Application of the Multi-Dimensional Framework in a Resilience Test of Health Systems 
In a resilience test, shocks or other major structural changes are introduced into the 
health system using ‘what if’ scenarios. Then, hypothetical responses to the shock are 
examined by stakeholders to identify strengths and weaknesses in system performance 
under plausible stressors. Similar to a prudential stress test of banks, a resilience test on a 
health system implies that the interest is in system-wide effects, not on the impact on 
Figure 1. Multi-dimensional Health and Social Care Systems (MHSCS) conceptual framework. Source: Expert Panel
Opinion [10].
Elements of the MHSCS conceptual framework feature within and across the inputs-
outputs-outcomes structure. Health workers and community carers are health system
critical “inputs” that must be supported by adequate infrastructure (buildings, primary
and secondary care facilities, equipment) and information systems. Governance and lead-
ership help to ensure that everyone works towards a common goal, including cooperation
across health systems. Among the “outputs” of the health system, health and community
workers deliver health services, social and community care, and health promotion activities.
Furthermore, health services must be accessible, of high quality, and responsive to patient
needs. In terms of “outcomes”, health services contribute to the health and well-being of
patients and individuals, and the rules governing the access to such services (e.g., the ab-
sence of co-payments) determine financial protection. Equity is a ubiquitous health system
objective, but inequities frequently persist both in the health care delivery (“output”) and
in health or other “outcomes”. Efficiency, through improved organization and delivery
of health and community services (“outputs”), can also improve “outcomes” through
better access, quality and responsiveness (“outputs”). Financing arrangements affect both
users and providers of health care. Existing and potential future patients contribute to
financial protection by financing the health system through taxes and social insurance
contributions. In turn, the resources collected are redistributed to providers under a wide
range of financial arrangements.
3.2. Application of the Multi-Dimensional Framework in a Resilience Test of Health Systems
In a resilience test, shocks or other major structural changes are introduced into the
health system using ‘what if’ scenarios. Then, hypothetical r sponses to the shock are
examined by stak holders to identify strengths and weaknesse in system performance
under plausible stressors. Similar to a prudential stress test of banks, a resilience test on
a health system implies that the interest is in system-wide effects, not on the impact on
specific health care institutions and how they individually cope in adverse scenarios. In
other words, it tests the health system as a whole, with its inter-connected parts, which is
often more than the sum of the impacts on individual entities. The inputs-outputs-outcomes
structure of the MHSCS conceptual framework is considered to be appropriate for this type
of assessment and can be used to examine immediate and potential downstream effects of
a shock to the system. As described in the Opinion [10], the MHSCS conceptual framework
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provides a common map that can be used to discuss mechanisms of action of hypothetical
shocks in the context of a ‘resilience test’ of health and social care systems. See Figure 2.
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Figure 2 illustrates how two different types of shocks and a structural change might
hypothetically impact health care system inputs-outputs-outcomes. In example (a), an
outbreak of an infectious disease affects population health (an “outcome” element), and
the health system needs to respond through a change in the organization of the workforce
and its resources (“input” elements), which will affect the delivery of the services (“output”
elements), but will also impact directly on the ability to maintain the delivery of services
(“outputs”). In example (b), a superbug caused by weak safety procedures in the delivery
of hospital services (“output”) has an immediate effect on patient health (“outcome”),
which in turn triggers corrective and containment measures in service delivery (“output”)
and organization of the medical workforce (“input”). The chronic shortage of certain type
of workers (“input”) can affect health system ability to deliver services (“output”) and
improve health (“outcome”).
The MHSCS conceptual framework has both theoretical and practical relevance to
the resilience test. First, it helps to crystalize thinking about the myriad ways in which
a pote tial shock might impact s stem functio ing. Second, the elements define broad
categories of potential indicators to monit r a d evaluate system functioning, both under
stress and in absence of a shock. Lastly, the MHSCS conceptual framework can assist
the stakeholders involved in the resilience test pro ss in building strategic resili nce.
As the potential relationships between the elements are explor d by stakeholders in the
context of hypothetical shocks in ‘what if’ sc narios, system-sp cific recommendations for
transform tion can be developed, implemented, and ass ssed in order to ensure optimal
health and social car system functioning in the long term.
3.3. Resilience Test Structure and Implementation Methodology
In the Opinion [10], a 5-phased resilience test was proposed with standardized toolkit
components. The resilience test ends with an action planning and transformation phase in
which health system capacities are strengthened to enhance resilience to future adverse
scenarios. Each phase is briefly described below, with any special considerations noted.
Throughout all of the phases of the resilience test process, the ability of the resilience test
to generate relevant data is assessed. Continuous monitoring and evaluation allows for
process improvement during the process, instead of after it has concluded. The toolkit
was designed to ensure meaningful assessment, yet to be sufficient flexible that can be
implemented across many different health systems with diverse institutional features.
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 4742 6 of 17
A visual representation of the resilience test process and key actors is provided
in Figure 3.
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3.3.1. Phase 0: Preparatory Phase
In this phase, the t s owners, who are the healt aut orities responsible for the heal
systems (at the national or regional lev l), ad pt th toolkit mat rials to heir health sys em
and contex . Qua titativ data to support the realistic developm nt of the adverse scenarios
is gathered. MHSCS elem nts and associated i dicators hypothesized to be im act d by
different adverse scenarios are defin d. The discussion guides for nteraction with health
systems stake olders are finalized. A trained facilit tor must be d signated to lead he
discussion groups. This per on may be from an external tea suppo ting resilience tes ing
across health systems, or may be a person from the regional/national health system who is
trai ed to effective carry out the facilitator functions.
3.3.2. Phase 1: Qualitative Data Collection
Step 1A—Assessment of baseline functioning and relevance of indicators: Stake-
holders convene in groups of eight based on their role in the health system (e.g., type of
health care provider, manager, user, and inter-sectoral collaborator). The facilitator uses
the adapted toolkit to lead stakeholders through a discussion examining the normal and
natural evolution of health system functioning in the absence of any particular stressor
(under “normal” conditions). The stakeholders address the extent to which each indicator
is aligned with health system values and context. The information from this discussion is
used for the stoplight scoring system in Phase 3.
Step 1B—Assessment of functioning under adverse scenarios: The facilitator presents
each group of stakeholders the “what if” adverse scenario and elicits responses from the
group as to the impact on the health system based on how the group members themselves
would react or respond. The discussion guide from the toolkit that is specific to the adverse
scenario is used. Tabletop exercises methodologies (see [16–18]), which include participa-
tory leadership, Participatory Learning and Action, Design Thinking, and LEGO© Serious
Play, facilitate in-depth analysis by the participants and lead to knowledge generation.
Each group discusses the changes in the elements and relevant indicators that the health
system would experience relative to baseline capacities. Both short-term and longer-term
impact and responses are considered. For instance, as the scenario evolves over time,
stakeholders examine the system response to actions taken, known as second-round effects.
Some general questions, relevant to any adverse scenario, include
1. What is the impact of the adverse scenario? Where does it impact in the health system?
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2. What tools and resources are available to be exploited (e.g., databases, protocols,
human resources)?
3. How will the adverse scenario be managed from an organizational perspective (e.g.,
organizational models, capacities of staff, organizational change)?
4. What aspects of the ecosystem (e.g., mental health, psycho-social impact, equity,
human rights, social cohesion) will be monitored and how?
5. How will decisions be made and implemented?
6. How will different levels of care communicate and integrate?
When the discussion concerning the first adverse scenario has concluded, a second
adverse scenario is presented to the group and a new discussion ensues. At least two
adverse scenarios should be presented and assessed separately in this step to show vary-
ing responses.
3.3.3. Phase 2: Quantitative Data Collection
Based on the Phase 1 discussions with stakeholders, health authorities identify and ob-
tain available supplemental quantitative data on the indicators under “normal” conditions
and are asked to simulate changes to these values in response to each adverse scenario.
Additional discussion groups can be conducted as needed to ensure a comprehensive
assessment of health system response under both adverse scenarios.
3.3.4. Phase 3: Summarizing
The facilitator and members of the external support team synthesize the qualita-
tive Phase 1 and quantitative Phase 2 information collected. They may be assisted by
regional/national health authorities, and possibly by representatives from other health
systems who have already completed the resilience test process. The synthesis involves
quantifying the information gathered from the prior phases to produce a health system-
specific scorecard. This entails assessing each of the relevant indicators identified for each
relevant MHSCS element according to the Phase 0 and Step 1A results. Each indicator is
rated on a 4-point Likert scale. Appropriate weights for each indicator of a given MHSCS
element are determined by interpreting the data in Step 1A. The scorecard is generated.
3.3.5. Phase 4: Reporting and Action Planning for Transformative Change
Step 4A—Reporting: Results are shared with stakeholders—both those who partici-
pated in the prior phases and other stakeholders who did not directly contribute informa-
tion. Small groups of stakeholders convene and, led by the facilitator, engage in critical
reflection on the results. These groups identify specific key areas where improvements are
needed, and offer recommendations in the form of summative as well as formative evalua-
tion. The results across groups are synthesized by the facilitator, external support staff, and
possibly national health authorities and representatives from other health systems.
Step 4B—Action planning and implementation: This step is crucial for the develop-
ment of strategic resilience, in other words, to achieve long-term changes to counteract
the effects of similar adverse scenarios in the future. The regional/national health au-
thorities identify, based on the results, an owner of the process of action planning and
implementation. He/she should be a stakeholder with high interest and endurance, able to
overcome obstacles, motivate others, and sufficient drive to follow-through on goals. This
individual should have a certain level of power and a reasonable level of capacity to be
able to transform the structures and functions in the health care ecosystem. The collab-
orative process that this individual will lead requires participatory leadership methods
and expertise in consensus building. He/she will have to balance the potential impacts of
various changes, as well as competing timeframes, feasibility, interests and power of the
stakeholders involved, all while maintaining trust.
Based on the scorecard from Phase 3 and the recommendations from Step 4A, a
collaborative process is led by the owner of this phase so that stakeholders can act on
the MHSCS elements. Relevant facilitators and barriers to implementation of key recom-
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mendations are identified and strategies to strengthen or overcome them are developed.
Qualitative assessments underlying the scorecard summary are reviewed for potential
additional solutions.
In summary, the resilience test implementation process is a dynamic, iterative, and
collaborative process in which test owners (e.g., national health authorities) engage diverse
stakeholders from the health ecosystem. Stakeholders include individuals who design
health systems and/or have strategic decision making capacity in the health system, which
will help to ensure that the resilience test results lead to action planning for improvement.
Stakeholders also include inter-sectoral collaborators that influence population health,
e.g., by professionals in education and housing sectors. Emphasis in the implementation
methodology is placed on inclusive, participatory strategies based on “proportionate uni-
versalism” that includes everyone but with a progressively greater emphasis on vulnerable
or at-risk groups [19]. The collaborative process requires that stakeholders involved in the
resilience test process have a safe environment in which to express their opinions without
fear of reprisal. Test owners must be willing to listen to these views and offer stakeholders a
voice. Similarly, test owners, in collaboration with external support staff, should foster trust
among stakeholders. In essence, the test owners must demonstrate openness to feedback,
including potential criticism, and a desire to improve. The test owners must have sufficient
political, scientific and operational capacity to carry out the test in this manner.
3.4. Core Components of the Resilience Test Toolkit
The resilience test “toolkit” is a set of four standardized components that form the
basis of resilience testing of health care systems. See Table 1. Each component has a process
that allows it to be customized to each unique health system’s context, as described below.
The Opinion [10] identified some of the these components. In this paper, we offer additional
components and further elaborate and clarify the customization process.
Table 1. Four components of the resilience test toolkit.
Components of a Resilience Test Toolkit
1. Adverse “what if” scenarios
2. Menu of key indicators
3. Associated discussion guides
4. Assessment scorecard template
3.4.1. Component 1: Different Adverse ‘What If’ Scenarios
In order for the resilience test of health systems to be as accurate as possible, realistic
adverse “what if” scenarios must be fully developed. Those scenarios which contain threats
that health system stakeholders believe that they will have to face in the future will be the
most effective resilience test scenarios. Because two scenarios are part of the resilience test
implementation, the toolkit should have at least five different scenarios for the test owners
to choose from. Table 2 describes the basic elements of one possible adverse scenario—that
of a “super-bug” outbreak.
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Table 2. Example of basic elements of a resilience test adverse scenario: a “super-bug” outbreak.
“Super-Bug” Outbreak ‘What If’ Scenario to Be Customized
“On any given day, about one in 31 hospital patients has at least one healthcare associated
infection”, stated by CDC.
The health system of country ‘x’ is characterized by [fill in specifics of the country]. The hospital
sector has ‘y’ hospitals, which employ ‘L’ workers overall. Every year ‘n’ patients are admitted
into hospitals for various treatments, totaling ‘w’ days of stay.
In a recent census of health care-associated infections in hospitals, it was found that 30% [or any
other high number] of patients were affected by a particular species of multi-resistant bacteria.
The reported mortality rate is 15%. The mode of transmission of infection of this infection is not
yet fully understood, though contact with contaminated surfaces seems to be dominant.
Closure of affected areas to control the outbreak through extensive cleaning is deemed necessary
by experts. This means a shutdown of an estimated 35% of hospital capacity for a period of
10–14 days. The cleaning process entails considerable additional costs, with a 50% chance of a
second cleaning procedure being required depending on results following the first
cleaning procedure.
Closure of hospital facilities will prevent admission and outpatient visits by new patients to
affected facilities.
Health authorities have to decide how to best control the “superbug”. The main question is how
to achieve such control and resume normal activity levels of health care providers with the lowest
cost to the population.
The toolkit includes instructions for the test owner in the health system to customize
each adverse scenario to his/her context. Together with the external staff supporting the
resilience test implementation process, the test owner adapts the scenario to make it more
relevant for that particular health system. The “super-bug” scenario might be tailored to
a particular health system by adding tables of data indicating how different hospitals in
the country are being affected. A fictitious letter or report from the administration at an
important hospital in the country and addressed to health authorities could specify their
experience and request closure. Regarding the cleaning procedures, the scenario could
include descriptions of three possible technologies that might be used, along with costs and
timeline for procurement. A report describing the human resource capacities required for
the clean-up could be added. Adding these details to make the ‘what if’ scenario realistic is
likely to enhance the validity of the results for different health systems.
To further tailor the ‘what if’ scenario to different groups of stakeholders, the toolkit
provides some initial areas of concern common across health systems with respect to the
given scenario. These concerns tend to differ by type of stakeholder, and stakeholders
within and outside of the health system should be considered. Each scenario is accom-
panied by a list of concrete questions so that country-specific characteristics can be fully
incorporated as relevant. Some possible issues relevant to the “super-bug” scenario are
highlighted in Table 2.
Initial discussions about the scenarios between the test owner and external support
staff can allow for new elements to be scripted into the scenario as required by the particular
health system. For instance, as a result of discussion the communication issues facing
decision makers, the “super-bug” scenario text for this group might include supplementary
text suggesting “Public opinion and polls ahead of a general election in 9 months has
increased pressure on the Minister of Health to act decisively. In the cabinet of the Minister,
a decision has to be made regarding centralizing decisions made concerning hospitals, as
well as the communication strategy, or taking a decentralized approach, leaving decisions
to individual hospitals. A task force has been created to advise on this issue.” Further
discussions between the test owner and test collaborators might consider prior health
system experience with other shocks that have actually occurred in the past. Together, the
test owner and the external support staff might hypothesize mechanisms of action of the
shocks presented in each of the five scenarios using the MHSCS conceptual framework
elements in order to appropriately select the two scenarios for use in the resilience test
implementation sessions. The purpose having multiple scenarios to choose from and being
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able to customize them is to specify the “right questions” that guide the test owner to
examine the necessary aspects of system functioning under stress.
3.4.2. Component 2: Menu of Key Indicators
The second core component of the resilience test toolkit is the menu of key indicators
that correspond to the elements of the MHSCS conceptual framework. Numerous publi-
cations detail potential quantitative indicators of health system performance assessment,
monitoring, and/or strengthening. A non-exhaustive list includes those published by the
World Health Organization, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (e.g., the EC-OECD report [20] examining how resilient European health systems
have been to the COVID-19 crisis), reports by Eurostat and the European Observatory on
Health Systems and Policies [21], as well as compilations in prior opinions by the Expert
Panel [22]. Table 3 provides a potential selection of indicators that align with the elements
in the MHSCS and are relevant for health system functioning. Indicators of function under
“normal conditions”, e.g., in the absence of a particular shock, as well as a result of the
shock to the system are defined. This distinction is useful because a health system may be
able to effectively use existing knowledge and resources, but may struggle to use, adapt, or
develop new knowledge and resources when the system is under shock.
Table 3. Concern by specific stakeholder type as related to the super-bug ‘what if’ scenario to be
used for further customization.
Type of Stakeholder Issues to Consider to Customize the Scenario forCertain Stakeholders
Hospital managers
Senior clinicians
- Is it possible, given funding and capacity constraints, to
interrupt activity for cleaning?
- What are the consequences for different key stakeholder
groups in the various scenarios?
- Is there flexibility in finding alternative treatment settings,
including use of ambulatory settings or primary care?
- Is it necessary to implement new training for health workers
or new processes, or do existing processes, such as cleaning,
just need to be enforced?
- What issues need to be considered regarding presentation of





- Might the closure of hospitals affect some groups more
than others?
- Which patient groups might be most affected?




- Should each hospital develop its own communication plan
or should decisions be centralized in some way?
- Who leads or coordinates efforts in this respect?
- What information should be released to the public?
It is important to note that indicators for a given element can be specific, objective and
quantitative (such as the number of patients per medical professional) or more subjective
and qualitative (for instance, the extent to which different specialties and disciplines
are integrated within the health system). Both types of indicators provide important
information with respect to health system functioning.
One possible approach to selecting relevant indicators can leverage realist evaluation,
which is being used increasingly in health services research. Realist evaluation examines
‘What works for whom, in what circumstances and why?’ [23]. Discussions between test
owners and external collaborators in the resilience test preparation phase can apply this
realist approach to hypothesize context-mechanism-outcome (CMO) configurations under
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adverse scenarios [24,25]. The hypotheses that are generated can be used to extend the
lists of health system-specific indicators that reflect actual functioning. The hypotheses
help to ensure the selection of meaningful indicators of health system functioning, both in
“normal” conditions and when a shock is introduced into the system.
3.4.3. Component 3: Discussion Guide for Facilitation of Resilience Test
Implementation Sessions
The third core component of the resilience test toolkit is the discussion guide that
will used by the facilitator of the discussion sessions with stakeholders that are central
to resilience test implementation. A discussion guide script outline for each MHSCS
element and related to the menu of indicators will help stakeholders to consider system
functioning both under “normal” conditions (in the absence of the shock) and after the
shock hits the system. The discussion guide can consider the possible existence of a one-
to-one relationship between indicators of functioning from “normal” to “shock”, as well
as the comprehensiveness of the menu of indicators for each MHSCS element. Through
discussion, additional indicators can emerge.
To illustrate how the discussion guide might be fully developed within the resilience
test toolkit, the “super-bug” ‘what if’ scenario from Table 2 is expanded. As prerequisites,
a fully elaborated, system-specific scenario has been established (core toolkit component 1)
and key health system elements and indicators affected have been determined, potentially
using CMO configurations (core toolkit component 2). As seen in Figure 2 example (b),
the super-bug is purported to have an immediate impact on population health ‘outcomes’
and health care services ‘outputs’. Multiple MHSCS elements (‘inputs’) are affected down-
stream by the shock. The elements affected may vary across health systems, but can be
hypothesized to include health workforce, information systems, and infrastructure. Gover-
nance also becomes especially critical in times of stress. Therefore, it would be essential to
include these elements and related indicators in the discussion guide.
Discussion questions may differ depending on the stakeholder group being addressed
(see Table 3 for examples of how the health system-customized scenario can be tailored).
Table 4 suggests that example potential MHSCS indicators concerning the Health Workforce
element means that discussion questions would be developed to center on the extent to
which the health system adequately:
• Trains qualified professionals,
• Integrates different specialties and disciplines,
• Addresses mental health of professionals,
• Re-assigns health professionals,
• Engages in task shifting, and
• Expands responsibilities of health professionals.
In addition, available quantitative data at baseline would be collected on:
• Different types of professionals per population,
• Patients per type of health professional, and
• Integration schemes covering different types of patients and health professionals.
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The participants would then be guided by additional questions to help them anticipate
how these capacities and numbers might be impacted by the shock in the ‘what if’ scenario.
Similarly, questions on how the health services element may be affected by the “super-
bug” scenario might include the extent to which the health system maintains access in line
with health needs, including mental health care, and ensures access to care for vulnerable
groups, as well as supports primary care services. In addition, the participants can discuss
how certain quantitative indicators, such as waiting times for services, satisfaction ratings,
and percent of the population without coverage might change over time as the system
responds to the shock and adapts.
Each of the other relevant elements and key indicators (e.g., information systems,
infrastructure, and governance) would be discussed in a similar manner by referring to the
indicators and corresponding discussion questions.
3.4.4. Component 4: Scorecard Template to Synthesize Results
As means of feedback to the health system stakeholders and to facilitate further
discussion on planned improvements, it is valuable to have a template to synthesize the
information collected during the resilience test and offer an overview of health system
functioning. One way to accomplish this is via a scorecard or dashboard with traffic lights
for each MHSCS element based on the compilation of relevant indicators. The purpose
of the scorecard is to offer a snapshot view of elements of health system functioning both
under “normal” conditions and in each ‘what if’ scenario discussed as part of the resilience
test implementation. A green light indicates that the element is functioning well in the
given condition and is likely to weather the shock. Yellow suggests some deficiencies in that
element and that caution is warranted. Red indicates that the element is not functioning
adequately and/or is not expected to effectively adapt to the shock to the system. See
Figure 4 for an example scorecard. The radar plots in the last row show the scores of the
individual indicators that roll-up to the lights displayed in the ‘what if’ scenarios in the
rows above.
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The scorecard is an important outcome in that it is a meaningful way to display
aggregate results to the health system stakeholders in order to understand the areas in need
of action. Therefore, scorecards must take into account that there may be various effective
ways that a given health system may be able to absorb and/or adapt to a particular shock.
Ultimately, the outcome of the resilience test determines if the system has enough green
lights on (a) enough indicators, or (b) enough critical indictors, or (c) the right combination
of indicators, to effectively respond to the shock. A health system that achieves green
lights for all elements under all scenarios may want to assess alternate scenarios to ensure
resiliency under different types of shocks. Green lights across all elements and scenarios
might also suggest that this system is ready to further the integration of existing capacities
and move towards becoming an integrated resilient health system.
The resilience test implementation process depends heavily on the collection of quali-
tative data via discussion groups with key stakeholders. This information, combined with
available quantitative data, must be quantified according to the key indicators and used for
score card generation. Once data collection in the resilience test implementation process
has concluded in Phases 1 and 2 of the resilience test implementation process, the facilita-
tor, in collaboration with an external support team and possibly with regional/national
health authorities, will rate each indicator on a 4-point Likert scale, both for functioning
under normal conditions and in each adverse scenario discussed. In other words, for each
indicator, a forced choice as to adequacy vs. inadequacy must be made. This occurs in the
summarization Phase 3.
In order to roll-up the multiple indicators of functioning into an overall stoplight value
of a given MHSCS element, the indicators must be weighted. Ideally, weighting of critical
indicators would be evidence based, using scientific literature to describe the relationship
between similar shocks experienced in the past with their inputs/outputs/outcomes
impacts and responses within a given health system. However, the health care system and
its ecosystem is a complex system, and shocks can be expected to cause context-dependent
impacts and context-specific responses. Thus, there are a number of significant challenges
with an evidence-based approach to scoring, including the different characteristics of a
health care system influencing the impact of the shock and the system’s response to the
shock, the existence of multiple shocks in any given prior actual adverse scenario whose
impacts cannot be teased apart, the role of timing and order of multiple shocks on impacts
and health system responses, and the multiplicative (not solely additive) impacts and
responses to these multiple shocks.
To address these challenges, the resilience test implementation process allows the
stakeholders involved to determine how the key indicators need to be weighted to ap-
propriately assess the MHSCS element. This occurs in the Phase 1 discussion groups
of different stakeholders. The determination of appropriate weights for the indicators
may involve the realist approach of CMO configurations [24,25] previously discussed, or
might leverage other techniques, such as multi-criteria decision making, from the field of
operations research. This process customizes the results of the resilience test, and when
effectively carried out, can be expected to lead to findings that are more meaningful and
actionable for the health system.
4. Discussion
We have developed a resilience test concept and methodology, and described key
components of a toolkit and a 5-phased approach to implementation of resilience testing
that can be adapted to individual health systems. A resilience test of a health system
becomes valuable to decision makers in that system only when it can offer actionable,
system-specific results that can transform the system and make it more resilient to future
shocks or structural changes in the future. However, this can be challenging because health
systems are diverse. The development of a resilience test applicable across different health
systems needs to balance the standardization of the methodology with its adaptability
to be tailored to individual health systems. For this reason, our proposed resilience
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test incorporates a qualitative approach to data collection, via table-top exercises and
collaborative discussions of ‘what if’ scenarios that can be supplemented with quantitative
data on relevant indicators. Given the lack of existing literature on the practical application
of resilience testing of health systems, each toolkit component could be further developed.
We dedicated the discussion to providing a roadmap for this future research.
Regarding component 1, which relates to “what if” scenarios, various types of shocks
and structural changes are possible. A heuristic that classifies possible shocks to a health
system based on four dimensions—time, expansion, origin, and impact—is provided
as Supplementary Table S1. Other scenarios might be developed for shocks such as an
earthquake, or water poisoning by an unknown biological agent that affects multiple
organs and leads to death over time (slow burn of two months) or permanent mental
health problems. Additional scenarios might address structural changes, such as a sudden
budget cut in health care as a result of financial crisis because of the economic impact of
coping with COVID-19, steadily increasing privatization of a health system that impacts
accessibility, or a decrease in quality due to corruption. Future work could define and
develop adverse “what if” scenarios following and expanding upon the example of the
super-bug (see Table 2) to apply and further test the applicability of our methods.
Regarding component 2, which related to the menu of key indicators (see Table 4),
various different indicators are possible. However, the table is not a comprehensive list.
Future work could refine and/or expand the indicators of health system functioning within
the context of a resilience test. Targeted scoping reviews could be used to leverage the large
number of existing indicators in the literature [14,15,17,18]. Potential indicators could be
tailored and mapped to each of the ‘what if’ scenarios, depending on their hypothesized
effect on each MHSCS element. Supplementary Table S1 may be used to link the dimensions
of a shock to the particular elements and/or mechanisms of action affected within a health
system. CMO configurations may be helpful to determine additional, context-specific
relevant indicators for the different ‘what if’ scenarios.
Regarding component 3, future work could elaborate the discussion guides to be used
by the facilitator that would be aligned with the full set of ‘what if’ scenarios and complete
menu of indicators. Future considerations might include examination of the possible
existence of a one-to-one relationship between indicators of functioning from “normal” to
“shock”, as well as questions to help the stakeholders evaluate the comprehensiveness of
the menu of indicators for each relevant MHSCS element. Specific questions to address
the value of each element within the health care system, to be used for weighed scores,
are warranted. Similarly, regarding component 4, the process of customization of results
into a scorecard requires testing and validation, for instance through pilot studies of the
resilience test implementation process with extensive and continuous monitoring, along
with evaluation and documentation of strengths and weaknesses. The creation of a detailed
case example or case study to include the resilience testing methodology would be valuable
to enhance understanding of how the methods described in this paper might apply to
diverse health and social care systems.
There are a number of pragmatic open-ended implementation issues to be resolved
with future research. Consideration can be given to the appropriate time durations for
each phase of the resilience test and define adequate follow-up periods, as well as how
often the test should be repeated. The level at which to conduct the resilience test (national
vs. regional, depending on decision-making authority) and the role of federal bodies
(such as the European Commission) in carrying out the test deserves further examination.
Communication of results should also be explored with respect to the information provided
to the public and the methods used. A better understanding of the widespread applicability
of this resilience testing methodology to both high and low income countries’ health and
social care systems is required.
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5. Conclusions
In summary, to enable health system strengthening and transformation, it is critical
for countries to test their health system’s resilience and have a test methodology that
is balanced in terms of standardization and system-specific characteristics/needs. This
paper has refined the definition of resilience and mapped it to a multidimensional frame-
work for health and social care. We outlined the foundation for a 5-phase resilience test
characterized by a collaborative, multi-stakeholder design. Participatory processes in-
volve diverse individuals from the health ecosystem in the assessment and transformation
stages. Four resilience testing toolkit components, along with their customization pro-
cesses, have been presented. These provide a certain level of standardization of the testing
process, while permitting health authorities the flexibility of adapting the tools to their
context. Additional research is needed to fully elaborate these components and pilot the
customization processes. Furthermore, research is needed to test and validate the full
5-phase resilience test implementation process, which represents a significant advancement
in the operationalization of health system resilience.
The type of participatory processes involved in the proposed resilience testing method-
ology suggests there is value in engaging in collaborative processes across borders. Learn-
ing communities created at the international level could function as scientific communities
to bring together, synthesize and share evidence on experiences with resilience testing to
support harmonization in international approaches balanced with system specifics.
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